File:A Rohingya woman pictured at a World Food Programme food distribution supported by UK aid in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh, October 2017.jpg. (2025, March 31). Wikimedia Commons. Retrieved November 4, 2025, from https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.phptitle=File:A_Rohingya_woman_pictured_at_a_World_Food_Programme_food_ distribution_supported_by_UK_aid_in_Cox%27s_Bazar,_Bangladesh,_October_2017.jpg&oldid=1015420986.
Published on 2025-11-04 by Serena Pallan
The Rohingya are a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority from Myanmar's Rakhine State. Despite centuries of presence in the region, Myanmar's government has long denied them citizenship, rendering them stateless under the country's 1982 Citizenship Law, which excludes them from the list of recognized ethnic groups. Systematic discrimination, restricted movement, and limited access to education and healthcare have defined their existence in Myanmar for decades.
In August 2017, a military crackdown following militant attacks triggered a massive refugee crisis. Over 700,000 Rohingya fled to neighboring Bangladesh, joining earlier waves of refugees in sprawling camps near Cox's Bazar. Today, over one million Rohingya live in these settlements, the world's largest refugee camp, facing uncertainty about their future. Without citizenship in Myanmar and temporary protection status in Bangladesh, the Rohingya remain in a precarious legal position, unable to return safely home yet unable to build permanent lives in exile. International observers have characterized the violence against them as ethnic cleansing, with ongoing calls for accountability and sustainable solutions.
In April 2025, Myanmar announced 180,000 Rohingya were “eligible” to return from Bangladesh, a gesture framed as humanitarian opening even as conflict in northern Rakhine, Myanmar’s primary Rohingya settlement, intensified. Restrictions on property, employment, and movement have entrenched poverty and dependence for the Rohingya. Despite this, the Rohingya maintain a deep connection to their homeland and desire to return. Repatriation, however, cannot be symbolic, it must rest on enforceable commitments to uphold rights, provide protections, and rebuild infrastructure so return is safe, dignified, and sustainable.
Simultaneously, life in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh’s largest camp, is becoming increasingly precarious. In 2024, limited mental health services left populations vulnerable to depression, anxiety, and psychosomatic disorders. Food entitlements were reduced in 2023 and 2025, and UNICEF reported a 27 percent increase in severe acute malnutrition among Rohingya children. The combined “pull” of repatriation and “push” of humanitarian contraction risk turning repatriation into a choice between two untenable options.
Legal Obligations and Statelessness
The right to health is not just an aspiration; it is a legal obligation under international law and must be maintained across all sites where Rohingya reside: the camps, Bhasan Char, and prospective areas in Rakhine. Health outcomes are inextricably tied to civil status, freedom of movement, and social protections, all of which continue to be compromised.
The 2017 displacement of over 750,000 Rohingya triggered parallel legal proceedings uncommon in similar contexts. The ICJ issued provisional measures under the Genocide Convention in January 2020 and rejected Myanmar’s preliminary objections in July 2022, keeping the case active. In parallel, the ICC authorized a 2019 investigation into alleged crimes including deportation and persecution. The proceedings established a critical baseline for protecting safety and dignity.
Myanmar’s legal engineering of statelessness complicates returns. The 1982 Citizenship Law strips Rohingya of nationality, and the National Verification Card (NVC) provides identification but does not confer full citizenship or civil rights. Returning Rohingya would remain unable to access health services, legal recognition, property, education, or political participation.
Rohingya repatriation is further complicated by the tension between state sovereignty and refugee protection. Bangladesh, while not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, is still bound under the ICCPR, ICESCR, and CAT to provide non-discriminatory access to health services and prevent refoulement. However, these obligations are undermined by conditions in camps that violate the right to health: in addition to those mentioned previously, persistent trauma, especially among women and girls who experienced sexual violence during the 2017 genocide, remains unaddressed; roughly 47% of Rohingya women surveyed in Cox’s Bazar reported receiving no antenatal healthcare, with nearly 68% lacking preconception services; in 2022, there was a large resurgence of dengue cases throughout the camps.
However, it is necessary to acknowledge the burden on Bangladesh and the structural constraints it faces. Hosting nearly a million displaced Rohingya since 2017 has strained health and infrastructure. International donor fatigue and domestic political pressures complicate its position, making repatriation appear as the only long-term solution.
Health Safeguards for Repatriation
A health-centered framework provides a clear starting point: guaranteeing essential healthcare sets the standard for protecting other rights and making repatriation safe. If Bangladesh promotes returns without guaranteeing adequate healthcare access, it risks violating international obligations. Myanmar (a party to ICESCR) cannot rely on territorial claims to sidestep responsibility; areas of return must be demonstrably safe with sufficient medical services.
International health standards should be operationalized through widely accepted WHO norms, UNHCR’s Global Strategy for Public Health, and the Sphere Handbook. Enforcement rests on a layered system: WHO provides technical standards; UNHCR adapts them into operational indicators for camps and returnee areas; independent monitors like the International Rescue Committee or ICRC verify compliance. Precedent exists: under the Afghanistan Compact, international donors tied health-sector aid to benchmarks like increased skilled birth attendance and expansion of rural health services, while redirecting funds through NGOs when central authorities failed to deliver. Accountability can be enforced without punishing vulnerable civilians.
In Myanmar and Bangladesh, key health benchmarks should include, at a minimum:
- Water and Sanitation: UNHCR and Sphere recommend 15–20 liters of safe water per person daily. While UNICEF is currently expanding Myanmar’s water access, Rakhine still lacks reliable systems.
- Maternal and Child Health: WHO and UNFPA standards recommend universal antenatal care, skilled birth attendance, and emergency obstetrics, which is notably lacking in Cox’s Bazar.
- Primary and Mental Health: UNHCR calls for integrated care and psychosocial support, in which infrastructure in both Myanmar and Bangladeshi camps is severely degraded.
- Mortality and Nutrition: after extensive investigation, the UNHCR recommended targeted nutrition programs, including therapeutic feeding and community-based interventions, to reduce global acute malnutrition in Cox’s Bazar.
Conclusion
Repatriation without enforceable health protections is not a solution—it is a sanction. Governments and international actors must make improvements to essential healthcare before any return is permitted. Only by centering repatriation around health, can the Rohingya achieve a return that no longer perpetrates cycles of statelessness and exclusion but protects their safety and dignity.
The views, thoughts and opinions expressed in this blog are the author’s only and do not reflect an official position of the University of Minnesota, the Human Rights Program, or the College of Liberal Arts. As an institution of higher education that values and promotes free speech, civil discourse, and human rights, we welcome a variety of perspectives and opinions from our student contributors that are consistent with these values.